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THE APPLICATION OF SURFACE WATER RULES
IN URBAN AREAS
I. INTRODUCTION
Many lawyers may have gone through law school and years of practice
without even hearing of the rules governing surface waters. But the expan-
sion of urban areas,I the adoption of surface water rules requiring a factual
determination of reasonableness, and the resulting increase in the number
of surface water cases being litigated 2 suggest that more and more lawyers
are likely to become involved in surface water problems.
The term "surface water ' 3 includes the runoff from rain and melting
snow which occurs in places other than defined streams or lakes or ponds.
Anytime it rains or snows there exists the potential for surface water
disputes. This potential is likely to develop into actual disputes, especially in
newly developed urban areas, which have not adequately planned for
drainage. Water that once flowed harmlessly in rural or unimproved areas
can cause considerable property damage in areas where houses and other
structures have been constructed.
An example of a surface water case 4 may better illustrate the types of
disputes likely to arise. A landowner decides to improve his property by
constructing apartment units and adjacent paved parking areas. The
amount of surface water runoff is increased when the improvements render
impervious the previously bare ground. The adjoining landowner finds that
the surface waters which formerly spread fanwise across her property now
flow in a concentrated manner and in an increased volume causing damage
to her property. Therefore she constructs a dam along her property line, the
effect of which is to back surface waters up onto the first landowner's
property, damaging that landownef's apartments and parking lot. Does
either landowner have a cause of action against the other for the damage to
their property? Who bears the cost of the first landowner's improvements?
1. The term "urban areas" as used in this comment includes cities, suburbs,
and the rapidly growing fringe areas near cities and suburbs which are undergoing a
change from rural to urban character.
2. From 1950-1970 approximately fifteen surface water cases were reported
at the appellate level in -Missouri. The same number of cases were reported from
1970-1975 alone. Approximately 11 inches of the 40 inches of average annual
rainfall in Missouri is runoff (surface water and groundwater). See McGuinness,
U.S.G.S. Circ. 1800 at 457-58 (1963).
3. "Surface waters" are those which, in their natural state, occur on the surface
of the earth in places other than definite streams or lakes or ponds; they may
originate from any source and may be flowing vagrantly over broad lateral areas or,
occasionally for brief periods, in natural depressions. See Oklahoma Water Resources
Bd. v. Central Oklahoma Master Conservancy Dist., 464 P.2d 748, 751 (Okla. 1968).
4. Pagliotti v. Acquisitapace, 64 Cal. 2d 873, 50 Cal. Rptr. 282, 412 P.2d 538
(1966).
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The answers to these questions may depend on which surface water rule is
applied.
Although many property related rules date back well before urban
problems demanded consideration, the development of surface water rules5
began only in the early nineteenth century. 6 This was a period when for the
first time the urban population was increasing faster than the rural popula-
tion. 7 So it is not surprising that in deciding which surface water rule to
adopt, many courts considered whether one rule or another was consistent
with the public policy favoring land improvement and development.8
In deciding who would bear the cost of ridding land of surface water
some courts noted that a rule which made an improving landowner liable for
damage caused by any change in the flow of surface water from his land
might discourage landowners from improving their land.9 Other courts
noted that a rule which held the improving landowner immune from liability
would be unfair to the landowner whose property was damaged. 10 A "fair"
rule, reasoned some courts, would be one that held liable the person who
changed the natural flow of water.1'
In response to the notion that public policy favored the improvement
and development of land some courts adopted the common enemy rule.12 In
response to the notion that a fair rule would be one that held liable that
person who changes the natural flow of water some courts adopted the civil
law (or natural flow) rule." Somewhat later, due to the dissatisfaction with
either of these rules, the reasonable use rule was adopted. 14
5. In contrast to the dearth of articles on surface water disputes in urban areas,
there are many articles on surface water in general. See, e.g., Kinyon & McClure,
Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REv. 891 (1940); Davis & Snodgrass, The
Law of Surface Water in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. REv. 137,281 (1959); Maloney & Plager,
Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty?, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 72 (1968); Beck, The
Law of Drainage, 5 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS (R.E. Clark, Ed., 1972).
6. Kinyon &McClure, supra note 5; Davis & Snodgrass, supra note 5, at 146-47.
7. The urban increase in population was not numerically larger than the rural
until after the Civil War. Since 1860, with the exception of the 1870's, every decade
has shown greater.urban than rural numerical growth. R. Cook, The World's Great
Cities: Evolution oi Devolution, POPULATION BULLETIN (1960).
8. See Hall'v. Rising, 141 Ala. 431, 37 So. 586 (1904); Levy v. Nash, 87 Ark. 41,
112 S.W. 173 (1908); Abbott v. Kansas City St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271 (1884);
Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N.J.L. 351 (1865); Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140 (1881);
Jordan v. City of Benwood, 26 SE. 266 (A. Va. 1896). Cf. Gannon v. Hargodon, 92
Mass. (10 Allen) 106 (1865).
9. Cases cited note 8 supra.
10. See Albany v. Sikes, 94 Ga. 30, 20 S.E. 257 (1894); Gillham v. Madison
County R. Co., 49 Ill. 484 (1869); Beck, The Law of Drainage, 5 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 5, at § 452.1.
11. Albany v. Sikes, 94 Ga. 30, 20 S.E. 257 (1894); Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Ill.
158 (1869).
12. Cases cited note 8 supra.
13. Cases cited note 10 supra.
14. Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H.
569 (1862). See also Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956);
Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163 32 N.W,2d 286 (1948).
1977]
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Many if not most of the recent cases involving surface water drainage
have involved disputes which arose in an urban setting. This is because in
and around large metropolitan centers greater building activity often results
in some change in the flow of surface water causing harm to a nearby
landowner. In this urban context some courts have reexamined the rules
applied in their particular jurisdiction. 15 Such an examination requires a
look at a number of practical and policy considerations required to develop a
rule suitable to urban needs.
In choosing a rule adaptable to urban areas courts have limited them-
selves to three principal views: the civil law rule, the common enemy rule,
and the reasonable use rule. This comment will discuss the application of
each of these rules to urban areas focusing on the history, modifications, and
modern status of these rules in urban areas.
II. THE CIVIL LAW RuLE IN URBAN AREAS
A. History
The civil law rule of surface waters is that a landowner who interferes
with the natural flow of surface waters is liable for any injury to other
landowners. The civil law rule-recognizes a servitude of natural drainage so
that a lower owner must accept the surface water which drains onto his land
but the upper owner has no right to alter the natural system of drainage to
the detriment of the lower owner.'6 In short, each landowner's duty is to
leave the natural drainage system undisturbed.
Most commentators attribute the origin of the civil law rule in this
country to an 1812 Louisiana case' 7 and an 1848 Pennsylvania case.18 In
these and 6ther early cases there was no mention of the common enemy rule
or the' reasonable use rule, neither of which were applied until after the
middle of the nineteenth century.19 While the early cases adopting the civil
law rule stated a variety of reasons for its adoption, Professors Kinyon and
15. See, e.g., Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 412 P.2d 529
(1966); Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956); Lunsford v.
Stewart, 95 Ohio App. 383, 120 N.E.2d 136 (1953); Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735
(R.I. 1975); Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971); City of Houston
v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1968); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224
N.W.2d 407 (1974).
16. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 891.
17. Orleans Navigation Co. v. New Orleans, 2 Martin 214 (La. 1812). See alsc
Code Napoleon art. 640.
18. Martin v. Riddle, 26 Pa. 415 (1848).
19. The common enemy rule originated in a series of Massachusetts cases
beginning in 1851: Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 63 Mass. 171 (1851); Flagg v.
Worcester, 79 Mass. 601 (1860); Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. 106 (1865). The
term "common enemy" is of English origin where it was used to refer to the legal
attitude toward the sea. King v. Commissioners of Sewers, 8 B. & C. 356, 108 Eng.
Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1828). See generally Davis & Snodgrass supra note 5, at 149-50. The
reasonable use rule originated in two New Hampshire cases. Bossett v. Salisbury Mfg.
Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862); Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870).
[Vol. 42
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McClure state the real reason for the rule was the idea that the least harmful
way to dispose of surface waters is to enforce the natural laws of drainage.20
The fact that normal urban development quite often caused a change in
the natural drainage system meant that improving landowners had addi-
tional costs to bear under the civil law rule. This factor influenced many
courts to reject it.21 Nevertheless, other courts still adopted the civil law rule
for a number of reasons22 including a belief that the rule did not in fact
inhibit growth and development.2 3 At one time or another at least 27
jurisdictions have followed the civil law rule.24 Most of the states following
the civil law rule have modified it in some way or another.2 5
B. Modifications Aimed at Adapting the Civil Law Rule to Urban Areas
Some jurisdictions which had adopted the civil law rule decided that
instead of modifying the rule to suit urban areas, a better approach would be
to adopt the common enemy or reasonable use rule for urban areas. 26 This
resulted in those jurisdictions having one rule for urban areas (common
enemy or reasonable use rule) and another rule for rural areas (civil law
rule).
An example of this approach is found in Ohio.27 In Lunsford v. Stewart2s
the defendant had raised the level of his lot, preventing surface water from
draining off of plaintiff's adjoining lot. Ohio had followed the civil law rule
and under this rule defendant would have been liable for preventing surface
water from draining off the plaintiff's lot. However, the court refused to
apply this rule to city lots. The court stated that as long as it was done in a
reasonable manner the owner of a city lotcould fill his lot and erect structures
thereon without being liable to the adjoining lot owner even though such
improvement diverts the natural flow of surface water.29
20. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 895; Davis & Snodgrass, supra note 5, at
14748. See also Gormley v. Sanford, 52 Ill. 158 (1869).
21. See Hall v. Rising, 141 Ala. 431,37 So. 586 (1904); Levy v. Nash, 87 Ark. 41,
112 S.W. 173 (1908); Boyd v. Conklin, 54 Mich. 583,20 N.W. 595 (1884); Abbott v.
Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271 (1884); Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N.J.L. 351
(1865); Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140 (1881); Lunsford v. Stewart, 95 Ohio App.
383, 120 N.E.2d 136 (1953); Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735 (R.I. 1975); Mulder v.
Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971).
22. See Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 895.
23. See generally Carland v. Aurin, 103 Tenn. 555, 53 S.W. 940 (1899).
24. See Beck, supra note 5, at § 452.2.
25. See text accompanying notes 26-40 infra.
26. Dickle v. Vann, 279 Ala. 153, 182 So. 2d 885 (1966); Lunsford v. Stewart, 95
Ohio App. 383, 120 N.E.2d 136 (1953); Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d
884 (1971). See also Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1338, 1350 (1950).
27. Ohio follows the civil law rule as to rural land. Johnson v. Goodview
Homes-i, Inc., 82 Ohio L. Abs. 526, 167 N.E.2d 132 (1960). As to urban areas it is
not clear whether Ohio follows the reasonable use rule or the common enemy rule
modified by reasonable use. See Beck, supra note 5, at § 456.2.
28. 95 Ohio App. 383, 120 N.E.2d 136 (1953).
29. Id. at 584, 120 N.E.2d at 137.
19771
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A similar approach was adopted in South Dakota. South Dakota is a civil
law jurisdiction 30 but after Mulder v. Tague3 1 the civil law rule has been
applied only in rural areas. The court in Mulder noted that because any
change in grade, level, or topography might affect natural drainage, the civil
law rule cannot be strictly applied in urban areas. The South Dakota
Supreme Court felt that to strictly apply the civil law rule to urban areas
would prevent the proper use, development, and enjoyment of urban
property.3
2
While this urban-rural "modification" of the civil law rule might more
accurately be described as a rejection of the civil law rule in urban areas, the
reasonable use modification to the civil law rule retains the basic notions of
the civil law.33 The leading case on the reasonable use modification to the
civil law rule is Keys v. Romley.3 4 In Keys the Supreme Court of California
reaffirmed California's acceptance of the civil law rule for both rural and
urban areas. This rule, the court observed, has the advantage of greater
predictability than either the common enemy or reasonable use rule and is
consistent with the expectation that buyers should take land subject to the
burdens of natural drainage. On the other hand, the court noted that if
strictly applied the civil law rule has some tendency to inhibit improvement
of land. Because almost any use of the property is likely to cause a change in
the natural drainage which may justify complaint by an adjoining land-
owner, the civil law rule "may be unnecessarily rigid and occasionally unjust,
particularly in heavily developed areas."33 The court decided, therefore,
that the application of the civil law rule must be modified by a test of
reasonableness.
This issue of reasonableness is a factual determination to be made after
considering all the relevant factors. A proper consideration in determining
"reasonableness" in land development problems is the relative utility of the
actor's conduct as compared with the gravity of the harm caused by the
alteration of surface water flow.- In this balancing of interests the Keys court
noted that if the weight is on the side of the landowner who alters the natural
flow of surface waters, then he has acted reasonably and is not subject to
liability. However, if the harm to the lower landowner is unreasonably
severe, then the upper owner, whose development caused the damage, must
bear the economic costs incident to the expulsion of surface waters. "If the
facts should indicate both parties conducted themselves reasonably, then
courts are bound by our well-settled civil law rule."3 6 This reasonable use
modification is not to be confused with the reasonable use rule.
37
30 See Young v. Huffman, 77 S.D. 254, 90 N.W.2d 401 (1958).
31. 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971).
32. Id. at 552, 186 N.W.2d at 889.
33. See notes 35-39'and accompanying text infra.
34. 64 Cal. 2d 396, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 412 P.2d 529 (1966).
35. Id. at 407, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 279, 412 P.2d at 535.
36. Id. at 410, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 281, 412 P.2d at 537.
37. The "reasonable use" modification to both the civil law rule and the common
[Vol. 42
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The following example illustrates how this modified civil law rule
differs from a strict application of the civil law rule. A landowner constructs
apartments on his land which change the natural flow of the surface water.
The adjoining lower landowner sues for damages caused by this change in
the flow of the surface waters. Under a strict application of the civil law rule
the landowner who constructed the apartments would be liable for any
damages caused by the change in the natural flow of the surface waters.
However, under the reasonable use modification to the civil law rule the
outcome is likely to be different. If the damages to the lower owner are slight
and if the upper owner has no alternative method of disposing of surface
waters, except across the lower owner's property, a court is likely to find that
the upper owner's conduct is reasonable and that he is not liable.38 It is likely
that a court may allow the upper owner to drain the surface water from his
land across the lower owner's land. While the upper owner may be required
to pay for the cost of a ditch or pipes the economic costs will probably be
much less than if he were liable for damages.
One other modification of the civil law rule which has made the rule
more practical in urban areas is the modification which allows a landowner
to make minor alterations in the flow of surface waters.3 9 Some courts in the
jurisdictions following this modification have recognized that a landowner
must have a privilege, under certain circumstances, "to make minor altera-
tions in the natural flow of surface water where necessary to the normal use
and improvement of his land. . . ...40 This is a limited modification which
varies from state to state.
C. Modern Status of the Civil Law Rule in Urban Areas
Historically, the civil law rule was thought to inhibit the development
and improvement of land.4" From a historical viewpoint alone, one might
enemy rule is not to be confused with the reasonable use rule. Under the reasonable
use modification the property-related civil law and common enemy rules are still
applied but they are modified by the tort concept of reasonable use. In contrast, those
courts adopting the reasonable use rule, instead of using the tort concepts as an
overlay to mitigate the results of the property-related doctrines, have created the
standards for behavior entirely out of tort law, and abandoned the notions of
servitude or absolute ownership. Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735 (R.I. 1975). See text
accompanying notes 125-27 infra. Earlier cases indicate that the reasonable use rule is
analogous to the same rule for watercourses (riparian rights), which is a property law
rule that uses equity concepts of fairness. See Franklin v. Durgee, 71 N.H. 186, 51 A.
911 (1901); Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870).
38. Cf. Pagliotti v. Acquistapace, 64 Cal. 2d 873,50 Cal. Rptr. 282,412 P.2d 538
(1966).
39. See, e.g., Kay-Noojin Development Co. v. Kinzer, 259 Ala. 49,65 So. 2d 510
(1953); Hankins v. Borland, 163 Colo. 575, 431 P.2d 1007 (1967); Chappell v.
Winslow, 258 N.C. 617, 129 S.E.2d 101 (1963); Slatten v. Mitchell, 22 Tenn. App.
547, 124 S.W.2d 310 (1938). See also Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421 (1958).
40. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 6, at 920.
41. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
19771
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expect that the civil law rule would have lost its vitality in this era of
ever-increasing urbanization. But this has not happened. In the past twenty
years very few civil law jurisdictions have been persuaded to reject the civil
law rule and adopt either the common enemy or reasonable use rule.42
Perhaps one reason for the continued vitality of the civil law rule in urban
areas is the modifications to the rule.
These modifications have not completely eliminated all difficulties,
however. The states that adopted either the common enemy or the reason-
able use rule for surface water disputes in urban areas but retained the civil
law rule for surface water disputes in rural areas face new problems. One
problem is determining what constitutes an "urban area" where the civil law
rule does not apply. Property has been classified as urban or rural "based on
whether or not the property is within the legal city limits rather than on the
probably more logical basis of whether the uses of the property, such as
residential subdivision or office park, is urban as opposed to rural. '43
Another problem with the urban-rural modification to the civil law rule
has to do with the fact that the courts adopting this modification are
assuming that either the common enemy or reasonable use rule work better
in urban areas than does the civil law rule. As will be discussed in a later
section" the validity of this assumption, especially in regards to the common
enemy rule, is questionable.
One question that arises is how well these modifications work. Because
they retain much of the basic foundation of the civil law rule alone it is
appropriate to discuss first its application in urban areas without modifica-
tion. Then its application as modified may be analyzed.
When looking at the application of the civil law rule to urban areas we
are again faced with the historical notion that the civil law rule discourages or
prohibits improvements of land. Certainly the fear expressed by some courts
that the civil law rule "prohibits" improvements is not true in the overwhelm-
ing majority of cases. A mere statement of the rule makes it obvious that in
the practical application of the rule improvements are not "prohibited."
Landowners may still improve their land but if they interfere with the
natural flow of surface waters to the injury of another landowner they will be
liable to that other landowner. What this means is that the improving
landowner must provide for a way of disposing of the surface water without
injuring other landowners or he must be willing to pay for the injuries to the
other landowner. The improving landowner is not "prohibited" from mak-
ing improvements, but he must bear the economic costs of his improve-
ments.
45
42. Ohio and South Dakota are two of the few jurisdictions which in recent
years have rejected the civil law rule. And these two jurisdictions rejected the rule in
urban areas only. SeeLunsford v. Stewart, 95 Ohio App. 383, 120 N.E.2d 136 (1953);
Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d 884 (1971).
43. Long & Long, Surface Waters and the Civil Law Rule, 23 EMORY L.J. 1015,
1029 (1974).
44. See text accompanying notes 109-112 infra.
45. See Comment, California's Surface Waters, 39 S. GAL. L. REv. 128 (1966).
[Vol. 42
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Whether the civil law rule "discourages" improvements is a more
difficult question. This notion is based on the fact that the person improving
his land would have to bear the economic costs of his improvements. When it
is said that the civil law rule discourages improvement and development of
land "[t]his assumes. . . that decisions of land developers are influenced by
rules of law regarding surface water disposal. The cases make no mention of
empirical data which would support the assumption."46 Furthermore, a
number of highly urbanized states follow the civil law rule and their growth
rate does not appear to have been discouraged by the existence of the rule.
47
Making the developer bear the economic costs of his improvements may
be an advantage of the civil law rule rather than a disadvantage:
The fact that one may have to drain land in order to develop it,
certainly does not mean that he should be able to force his neighbor
to pay for it. Nor does it mean that the public should pay for it,
particularly if the use to which he will put the land has no great
public benefit. While in the early days of the development of this
country, a presumption in favor of drainage may have been prop-
er, the policy today probably should favor retention of- as many
natural areas as possible.
48
Realizing that, as a general proposition, it cannot reasonably be said that
the civil law rule "prohibits" improvement of land, and that in many cases it is
not unreasonable to expect the developer to bear the economic costs of his
improvements, the validity of the historical notion that the civil law rule does
not work well in urban areas is questionable. The example used in the
previous section 49 may better illustrate this point. In that example a land-
owner constructs apartments on his land which change the natural flow of
the surface water. The adjoining landowner sues for damages caused by this
change in the flow of the surface waters. Under a strict application of the civil
law rule the landowner who constructed the apartments would be liable for
any damages caused by the change in the natural flow of surface waters.
However, in many instances the construction of an efficient drainage system
could have avoided any damages to the lower landowner.50 Similarly, even
after the construction of the apartments and resultant injury to the lower
landowner the improver can mitigate further liability by providing an
46. Hanks, Law of Waters in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 621, 691 (1968).
47. See, e.g., Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 412 P.2d 529
(1966), where the California Supreme Court stated:
[N]o documentation has been produced to establish that the [civil law] rule
has in fact impeded urban development in the state. A number of highly
urbanized states follow the rule, and California's phenomenal growth rate,
to which no one can be oblivious and of which this court may take judicial
notice, appears unstunted by the existence and application of the civil law
rule since 1872.
Id. at 406-07, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 279, 412 P.2d at 535.
48. Beck, supra note 5, at 578.
49. See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
50. See Comment, supra note 45.
1977]
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/9
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
alternate means of disposing of the surface waters. But in those situations
where there is no alternate means of disposing of the surface waters or
where the damage to the lower owner is slight the civil law rule may be
unduly harsh.5 '
When the reasonable use modification is added to the civil law rule the
rule is flexible in those cases where the strict civil law rule is unduly harsh.
For instance, in the above example the court would look at the utility of the
actor's conduct as compared with the gravity of the harm caused by the
alteration of surface water flow.5 2 If the harm to the lower owner is slight and
if there is no alternate rieans of disposing of the surface waters, the
improving landowner would probably not be liable.53 Furthermore, by
balancing the utility of the actor's conduct against the gravity of the harm the
courts are able to further public policy in individual cases, whether that
policy is one favoring improvement and development or favoring retention
of as many natural areas as possible. This flexibility, provided by the
reasonable use modification, is especially needed in urban areas where the
land use is varied.
While the reasonable use modification focuses on balancing the utility
of the actor's conduct with the gravity of the harm, the minor alteration
modification is limited to whether the flow has changed significantly or
causes more harm than it would if the alteration had not occurred.5 4 Thus
this modification is subject to the same criticism as the strict civil law rule: it
may work well in a majority of cases but in certain specific cases it is too rigid.
III. COMMON ENEMY RULE IN URBAN AREAS
A. History
Stated in its simplest form, the common enemy rule is that each
landowner has an unlimited and unqualified right to deal with the surface
water on his land as he sees fit, regardless of the harm which this may cause
to others.5
The development of the common enemy rule took place at approxi-
51. The improving landowner may also be liable for injury caused by actions of
the lower landowner that increase the damages, even if those actions are unreason-
able. Sheffet v. County of Los Angeles, 3 Cal. App. 3d 720, 84 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1970).
52. This balancing concept would also affect liability for the lower landowner's
conduct. Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 412 P.2d 529 (1966);
Klutey v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1967); Baer v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 255 Md. 163, 257 A.2d 201 (1969).
53. See Pagliotti v. Acquistapace, 64 Cal. 2d 873,50 Cal. Rptr. 282,412 P.2d 538
(1966).
54. See Hankins v. Borland, 163 Colo. 575, 431 P.2d 1007 (1967); Chappell v.
Winslow, 258 N.C. 617, 129 S.E.2d 101 (1963). See also Beck, supra note 5, at 506-07.
55. Kinyon & McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891,
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mately the same time as the civil law rule. 6 Kinyon and McClure state three
reasons why courts adopted the common enemy rule.57 One reason was the
traditional concept of land ownership that landowners should be able to do
as they please with their land.58 Other courts adopted the rule because, in
their opinion, it represented the "common law" view. 59 Still others adopted
this rule on the ground that it is consistent with the public policy favoring
land improvement and development. 60
Most, if not all, courts agree that the first two reasons given for adopting
the common enemy rule no longer retain the vitality they once had.61 Only
the third reason, that society has an interest in developing land, remains of
substantial importance. Many courts, from the beginning of the develop-
ment of the common enemy rule until today, have accepted this notion that
the common enemy rule furthers the policy of development and improve-
ment of land.62 As a consequence it is often stated that for urban areas the
common enemy rule is preferable to the civil law rule.63 As was observed
earlier, some civil law jurisdictions even went so far as to adopt the common
enemy rule for urban areas.6
Many states were first faced with deciding which surface water rule to
adopt at a time when urban population was beginning to grow rapidly and
development and expansion was emphasized.6 5 The reasonable use rule had
only been accepted by one jurisdiction6 6 at this time and was not considered,
by most courts, as an alternative to the civil law or common enemy rule. So, as
to choosing a rule that promoted the improvement and development of
land, courts limited themselves to the civil law and common enemy rule.
56. The first case to adopt the common enemy rule was Luther v. Winnisimmet
Co., 63 Mass. 171 (1851). See cases cited note 19, supra.
57. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 55, at 898-99.
58. See Id.; Davis & Snodgrass, The Law of Surface Water in Missouri, 24 Mo. L.
REv. 137, 151, 163-64 (1959). See also State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 14-15,224 N.W.2d
407, 414-15 (1974).
59. See Grant v. Allen, 41 Conn. 156 (1874); Goodale v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y. 459
(1864).
60. See, e.g., Edwards v. Charlotte, C. & A.R.R., 39 S.C. 472, 18 S.E. 58 (1893).
61. See, e.g., Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271 (1884);
Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N.J.L. 351 (1865); Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140 (1881).
62. See, e.g., Dekle v. Vann, 279 Ala. 153, 182 So. 2d 885 (1966); Levy v. Nash,
87 Ark. 41, 112 S.W. 173, 174 (1908); Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo.
271, 286 (1884); Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140, 148 (188 1); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d
1, 224 N.W.2d 407, 415 (1975) (abandoning common enemy rule). Cf. Keys v.
Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396,50 Cal. Rptr. 273,412 P.2d 529 (1966); Armstrong v. Francis
Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4, 10 (1956).
63. See Hall v. Rising, 141 Ala. 431,37 So. 586 (1904); Levy v. Nash, 87 Ark. 41,
112 S.W. 173 (1908); Abbott v. Kansas City St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271 (1884);
Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N.J.L. 351 (1865); Jordan v. City of Benwood, 26 S.E. 266 (W.
Va. 1896). Cf. Gannon v. Hargodon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 106 (1865).
64. See text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
65. Most courts decided which surface water rule to apply in their jurisdiction
between the years of 1860-1900. See generally Kinyon & McClure, supra note 55'
66. Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870).
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It is not clear from those cases where the common enemy rule was
adopted for the reason that it promotes development and improvement of
land whether the courts were more convinced that the common enemy rule
promoted the improvement of land than they were with the belief that the
civil law rule hindered the improvement of land.6 7 As a result, the opinions
were often couched in conclusory terms.68
For example, in Barkley v. Wilcox 69 surface water flowed naturally from
the plaintiff's lot over a depression across defendant's lot. The defendant
thereafter built a house on his lot, filled in the lot and graded up the sidewalk
in front of it. When it rained, surface water backed up onto the plaintiff's lot
and into his basement. In an action to recover damages the court held for the
defendant. The court stated that it is "for the public interest that improve-
ments shall be made, and that towns and cities shall be built.170 The court
reasoned that if it adopted the civil law rule "which will impose upon them
[the lower owners] a perpetual servitude, for the purpose of drainage, for
the benefit of upper proprietors," the lower owners' lots "must remain
unimproved. 71 In adopting the common enemy rule the court stated that it
is better "to establish a rule which will permit the reclamation and improve-
ment of low and waste lands."
72
In adopting the common enemy rule this court, as did other courts,
73
made the following assumptions: (1) if the civil law rule is adopted the lower
owners' lots "must remain unimproved;" and (2) the common enemy rule
promotes development and improvement of land. As previously dis-
cussed,74 the first assumption is not necessarily true, and in the following sec-
tion it will be seen that the second assumption is also questionable.
B. Modifications Aimed at Adapting The Common
Enemy Rule to Urban Areas
1. In General
Just as the civil law rule has been modified in most states so has the
common enemy rule.75 In certain modifications aimed at adapting the civil
law rule to urban areas some courts stated that these modifications were
67. See cases cited note 63 supra. Cf. Taylor v. Fickas, 64 Ind. 167, 175-76
(1878); Morrison v. Bucksport & B.R.R., 67 Me. 353, 356 (1877); Henderson v.
Hines, 183 N.W. 531, 534 (N.D. 1921).
68. See cases cited note 67 supra.
69. 86 N.Y. 140 (1881).
70. Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140, 148 (1881).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271, 286 (1884).
74. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
75. See Beck, The Law of Drainage, 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, (R.E. Clark,
Ed., 1972), at 491-98; Maloney & Plager, Diffused Surface Water: Scourge orBounty?, 8
NAT. RESOURCEsJ. 72, 81-94 (1968); Kinyon & McClure, supra note 55, at 913-35.
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necessary to make the civil law rule workable in urban areas. 76 However, in
modifying the common enemy rule, few cases can be found which state that
the rule is being modified to make it more workable in urban areas.
Perhaps the reason that few courts state they are modifying the rule to
make it more workable in urban areas is the historical notion that the
common enemy rule promotes development and improvement of land.
Because the common enemy rule was thought to work well in urban areas
perhaps the courts did not find it necessary to state the modifications of the
rule in terms of adapting the rule to urban areas.
Nevertheless there have been two modifications made to the common
enemy rule in a substantial number of jurisdictions. Although these two
modifications have seldom been expressly adopted for the purpose of adapt-
ing the common enemy rule to urban areas, they will be discussed as a
possible method of accomplishing that result. These two modifications to the
common enemy rule are the "collection and discharge" 77 modification and
the "due care" modification.78
Under the "collection and discharge" modification a landowner may
not collect large amounts of surface water on his land and then discharge it
onto adjoining land to its injury. This modification alone does not impose
liability on a landowner who dams surface water to the injury of another, or
who changes the course of, or increases the flow of, surface waters to the
injury of another.7 9 Generally, the collection and discharge modification is
only useful in imposing liability on a landowner who uses sewers or gutters to
collect and discharge surface waters on an adjoining landowner to his
injury.80
76. See text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
77. All common enemy jurisdictions have adopted some form of the "collection
and discharge" modification. For some different formulations of this modification
see Miller v. Darby, 336 Mass. 243, 143 N.E.2d 816 (1957); Haferkamp v. City of
Rock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. 1958); Nichol v. Yocum, 173 Neb. 298, 113 N.W.2d
195 (1962); Buffalo Sewer Authority v. Town of Cheektowaga, 20 N.Y.2d 47, 281
N.Y.S.2d 326, 228 N.E.2d 386 (1967); Gregory v. Bogdanoff, 307 P.2d 841 (Okla.
1957). See also Beck, supra note 75, at 491-92; Davis & Snodgrass, supra note 58, at
151.
78. In over half the jurisdictions that follow the common enemy rule some
form of the "due care" modification has been adopted. For some different formula-
tions of this modification, see Nichol v. Yocum, 173 Neb. 298, 113 N.W.2d 195, 199
(1962) ("without negligently or unnecessarily injuring another"); Kossoff v. Rath-
geb-Walsh Inc., 3 N.Y.2d 583, 170 N.Y.S.2d 789, 148 N.E.2d 132, 135 (1958)
("[P]rovided ... that the improvements are made in good faith to fit the property to
some rational use to which it is adapted. . ."); Yenchko v. Grontkowski, 385 Pa. 272,
122 A.2d 705 (1956) ("due care"). See also Beck, supra note 75, at 493-94; Davis &
Snodgrass, supra note 58, at 152-54.
79. See generally Maloney & Plager, supra note 75; Kinyon & McClure, supra
note 55; Davis & Snodgrass, supra note 58.
80. Cf. Kapayanis v. Fishbein, 344 Mass. 86, 181 N.E.2d 653 (1962); Buffalo
Sewer Authority v. Town of Cheektowaga, 20 N.Y.2d 47, 281 N.Y.S.2d 326, 228
N.E.2d 386 (1967); Seifert v. Sound Beach Property Owners Assn., 60 Misc. 2d 300,
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Under the due care modification, the court's determination is limited to
whether a landowner used "due care" 81 or "reasonable care"8 2 or was
"without negligence"8 3 in improving his land. Absent negligence or lack of
due care the common enemy rule is applied. 84 If the due care modification to
the common enemy rule was the equivalent of the reasonable use modifica-
tion to the civil law rule discussed earlier,85 the common enemy rule would
be a more practical rule for urban areas. But few if any common enemy
jurisdictions 6 applying the due care modification have gone so far hs to
apply a reasonable use modification which considers the utility of the actor's
conduct as compared with the gravity of the harm caused by the alteration of
surface water flow.
Thus, even when the due care modification is consistently applied it
only mitigates the harshness of the common enemy rule when the improving
landowner is negligent. The utility of the actor's conduct and the gravity of
the harm caused by such conduct are not usually considered. Consequently,
in many situations under the due care modification adjoining landowners
must bear the cost of another's improvements, and all the criticisms made of
the common enemy rule apply. 7 The due care modification, like the
collection and discharge modification, is of limited value in adapting the
common enemy rule to urban areas.
2. The Missouri Approach
a. "Due Care" Modification
Missouri is one state that has adopted some form of both modifications
of the common enemy rule. With numerous cases on this subject, 88 Missouri
303 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1969). In some states a landowner, if he meets certain requirements
may still be privileged to collect and discharge surface waters. Seetext accompanying
notes 104-08 infra; Borgman v. Florissant Development Co., 515 S.W.2d 189 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1974).
81. Yenchko v. Grontkowski, 385 Pa. 272, 122 A.2d 705 (1956).
82. Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271 (1884).
83. Nichol v. Yocum, 173 Neb. 298, 113 N.W.2d 195, 199 (1962).
84. Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 740 (R.I. 1975).
85. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
86. If Ohio is still considered a common enemy jurisdiction as to urban lands,
then it may be one of the few common enemy jurisdictions to adopt a reasonable use
modification to the common enemy rule. CompareLunsford v. Stewart, 95 Ohio App,
383, 120 N.E.2d 136 (1953) with Johnson v. Goodview Homes-l, Inc., 82 Ohio L.
Abs. 526, 167 N.E.2d 132 (1960).
87. For criticisms of the common enemy rule, see text accompanying notes
110-24 infra.
88. Some of the more recent Missouri cases are Hawkins v. Burlington No. Inc.,
514 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. En Banc 1974); Miller Land Co. v. Liberty Township, 510
S.W.2d 473 (Mo. En Banc 1974); Wells v. State Highway Comm'n, 503 S.W.2d 689
(Mo. 1973); Fisher v. Kansas City, 518 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975);
Borgman v. Florissant Dev. Co., 515 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974); Eilers v.
Kodner Dev. Corp., 513 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974); Camden Special
Road Dist. v. Taylor, 495 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973); Spain v. City of Cape
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is a good example of the results reached under the "due care" modification
and the "collection and discharge" modification. Missouri has followed the
common enemy rule since Abbott v. Kansas City St. J. & C. B. R.R.89 was
decided in 1884. Before this decision Missouri had followed the civil law
rule90 and before that the common enemy rule.9 1
The court in Abbott gave a traditional reason for adopting the common
enemy rule: "[I]t permits and encourages public and private improvements
.... "92 However, Abbott cited with approval an earlier Missouri case which
said: "[P]ersons exercising this right to improve and ameliorate the condi-
tion of their own land, must exercise it in a careful and prudent way." 93 The
Abbott court cited another case which said: "[I]n the case of surface water
which is regarded as a common enemy, he is at liberty to guard against it or
divert it from his premises, provided he exercises reasonable care and
prudence in accomplishing that object."9 4 And in stating its reason for
adopting the rule the Missouri Supreme Court said: "[I]t permits and
encourages public and private improvements, and at the same time restrains
those engaged in such enterprises from unnecessarily or carelessly injuring
another."95
The language used in Abbott is typical of that used in the "due care"
modification of the common enemy rule.96 However, the Missouri courts
have been reluctant to expand this reasonable care language. In fact, in
Camden Special Road Dist. v. Taylor97 this language was given a restricted
reading. In that case the lower landowners constructed a levee running east
and west across the north boundary of their land, thereby blocking the
natural flow of surface water from the north to the south, causing the water
to back'up onto and across a public road. The water standing on the road
prevented the public from using the road. The special road district sought a
mandatory injunction compelling the lower landowners to remove the levee
and to permanently enjoin them from constructing a levy which would bar
or impede the flow of surface water in the area of the road. The court held
that the lower landowners' action, although it forced surface water onto a
Girardeau, 484 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); Skaggs v. City of Cape
Girardeau, 472 S.W.2d 870 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971); Minton v. Steakley, 466 S.W.2d
441 (Spr. Mo. App. 1971).
89. 83 Mo. 271 (1884).
90. McCormick v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 70 Mo. 359 (1870); Shane v.
Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 71 Mo. 237 (1879).
91. Imler v. City of Springfield, 55 Mo. 119 (1874). For a discussion of the
history of surface water law in Missouri, see Davis & Snodgrass, supra note 58, at 281.
92. 83 Mo. at 286.
93. McCormick v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 57 Mo. 433,437 (1874), quoted
in Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271, 283 (1884).
94. Hosher v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 60 Mo. 329, 333 (1875), quoted in
Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271, 284 (1884).
95. 83 Mo. at 286 (emphasis added).
96. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
97. 495 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
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public road, was "cloaked with legal immunity by virtue of the 'common
enemy doctrine'."98 The court stated:
[T]he proviso attached to guarding against or diverting surface
water . .. does not, in any way modify or limit the basic and
inherent right constituting the heart and core of the "common
enemy doctrine" that a landowner may ward off surface water even
though in doing so he damages his neighbor. The proviso, that one
''exercises reasonable care and prudence" in doing so lends itself
solely to and prohibits unnecessary collecting and discharging
surface water to the damage of an adjoining owner.99
The language of Camden suggests that Missouri follows only the
"collecting and discharging" modification and not the "reasonable care"
or "due care" modification. But two Missouri Supreme Court decisions
after Camden indicate that Missouri still follows both modifications to the
common enemy rule. In Wells v. State Highway Comm'n'00 the court said
that one must act within reasonable limits and not recklessly before he is
given the benefit of the common enemy rule."' And in Miller Land Co. v.
Liberty Township,10 2 where there was no evidence that defendants had
unnecessarily "collected" and "discharged" water on the lower landowner,
the court again stated that rights given under the common enemy
rule must be exercised within reasonable limits.
b. "Collection and Discharge" Modification
A recent Missouri case is a good example of how this modification is
applied. In Borgman v. Florissant Dev. Co." 3 the defendants developed
an apartment complex on land abutting a tract of land belonging to
plaintiffs. The development included various storm sewers, drains, and
swales for the collection and diversion of surface waters. These waters
were drained through a concrete catch basin and a 10-foot weir situated on
defendants' property adjacent to the common boundary line with plaintiffs'
land. The surface waters were discharged onto plaintiffs' land from the
weir. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants from collecting and discharging
surface water onto plaintiffs' land.
From a general statement of the collection and discharge modification
it would seem that the plaintiffs would be entitled to an injunction. Clearly
the defendants "collected" and "discharged" surface water onto the
plaintiffs' lands. However, an injunction was denied. 1° 4 While Missouri
follows the "collection and discharge" modification, the courts distinguish
between the collection and discharge of surface water into a natural
98. Id. at 98.
99. Id. (citations omitted).
100. 503 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1973).
101. Id. at 692.
102. 510 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
103. 515 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
104. Id. at 191.
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drainway on the landowners' property, "where it would have gone
anyway, and the discharge of surface water on neighboring land where it
would not naturally have drained."' 5 A landowner may artificially collect
surface water by using sewers, gutters, and other artificial water channels
and discharge it on the neighboring lands provided he does so through a
natural drainway, without negligence, and provided further that he does
not exceed the natural capacity of the drainway to the damage of adjoining
land. 1°' Because the defendants in Borgman collected and discharged
surface water into a natural drainway without exceeding the natural
capacity of that drainway their conduct was privileged. 1 7
C. Modern Status of Common Enemy Rule in Urban Areas
Because the common enemy rule was historically applied by those
courts concerned with development in urban areas, one might expect that it
would have continued vitality in this era of ever-increasing urbanization.
However, the trend is otherwise. While many states still follow the
common enemy rule in one form or another, there is a definite trend
towards rejecting the rule. 0 8
The following three propositions may account for this trend: (1) the
common enemy rule does not always encourage development and
improvement of land;1°9 (2) public policy has begun to change from
favoring the developer to favoring the individual landowner and retaining
as many natural areas as possible;1 0 and (3) there never was much concern
about adapting the common enemy rule to urban areas. Consequently, even
the modified versions of the rule have become out-moded when applied in
certain factual situations in urban areas."' The first two propositions need
some explanation." 2
1. Encouraging Improvement of Land
When courts said the common enemy rule promotes improvement of
land and the civil law rule hinders improvement of land one assumption
105. Haferkamp v. City of Rock Hill, 316 S.W.2d 620, 627 (Mo. 1958).
106. Id. at 625-26.
107. Borgman v. Florissant Development Co., 515 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Mo. App.,
D. St. L. 1974).
108. The following jurisdictions have rejected the common enemy rule in favor
of the reasonable use rule: Hawaii: Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156,472 P.2d 509
(1970); Minnesota: Enderson v. Kelchan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948);
New Jersey: Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956); North
Dakota: Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967); Rhode Island: Butler v.
Bruno, 341 A.2d 735 (R.I. 1975); Texas: City of Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431
S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1968); Wisconsin: State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407
(1974).
109. See text accompanying notes 113-20 infra.
110. See text accompanying notes 121-33 infra.
111, See text accompanying notes 81-87 supra, where it is noted that the "due
care" and "collection and discharge" modifications apply only in limited situations.
112. The third proposition is discussed at text accompanying notes 82-88 supra.
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that was being made was that people would be less likely to improve their
land if they had to bear the economic costs of ridding their land of surface
waters. Under the civil law rule the improver must bear the costs of ridding
his land of surface water." 3 Under the common enemy rule the notion was
that the improver did not have to bear those economic costs.11 4
The following example from a case" 5 involving railroads illustrates
how the common enemy rule may encourage improvement of land. When
road beds were constructed, the natural flows of surface waters were often
obstructed thereby injuring adjoining landowners. If the civil law rule had
been strictly applied, the railroad would have had to bear the added expense
of making sure the surface water did not injure nearby landowners.
However, under the common enemy rule the railroad did not have to worry
about surface waters. Adjoining landowners who were injured had to bear
the expense of ridding their land of the surface water. The court may have
correctly concluded that under the common enemy rule the railroad would
be encouraged to make further improvements because it did not have to
bear the cost of any surface water damage.116
This reasoning, however, ignored the landowners bordering the
railroad whose land may have been flooded. Did flooding their land
encourage them to make improvements to their land? If the adjoining
landowners did not intend to improve their land, which may have been the
case in rural areas, the common enemy rule may have had the effect of
"encouraging" the improvement of land. However, this analysis is likely
to be different if the adjoining landowners had already improved or
intended to improve their land.
The case of Watters v. National Drive-In, Inc." 7 further illustrates
this point. In Watters the defendant built a drive-in theater next to
plaintiffs' property. Defendant changed the grade of the land, filled up
natural potholes, and prevented, by grading and gravelling, the natural
absorption of surface water into the soil. This resulted in a large amount of
water being drained onto the plaintiffs' land. Because of the water some
areas of plaintiffs' land could not be used and some improvements
plaintiffs had made were damaged. In applying the common enemy rule,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that the plaintiffs had no cause of
action for damages caused by the surface water.118
This result may have "encouraged" the defendants to improve their
land, but it certainly did not so encourage the plaintiffs. Ironically the
113. See Comment, California's Surface Waters, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 128 (1966).
114. Cf. Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271 (1884); Armstrong
v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956); Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N.Y. 140
(1881).
115. Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 83 Mo. 271 (1884).
116. Id.
117. 266 Wis. 432, 63 N.W.2d 708 (1954).
118. Id. at 437,63 N.W.2d at 711.
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common enemy rule may have encouraged the defendant to destroy or
damage other landowners' improvements. It is clear, therefore, that the
notion that the common enemy rule encourages improvement of land is not
always correct.1 9 The harsh results reached under the common enemy rule
in cases such as Watters have led some courts to reject the common enemy
rule. 120
2. A Change in Public Policy
Some courts' 2' have begun to question whether the need to favor land
development is as great as it once was. In addition, it is being recognized
that the needs of urban and suburban areas involve more than the need to
improve and develop. Among other things, people in these areas are
demanding that parks, lakes, and natural areas be retained. The policy of
favoring the developer may be proper at some times in some communities,
but at other times the policy favoring retention of as many natural areas as
possible is preferable.
Several courts have also questioned the value of making adjoining
landowners bear the costs of improvements made by another. In Armstrong
v. Francis Corp.122 the New Jersey Supreme Court said:
[W]hile today's mass home building projects . . . are
assuredly in the social good, no reason suggests itself why, in
justice, the economic costs incident to the expulsion of surface
waters in the transformation of the rural or semi-rural areas...
into urban or suburban communities should be borne in every case
by adjoining landowners rather than by those who engage in such
projects for profit. 123
Because of the varied land uses in urban areas, a rule which makes each
adjoining landowner bear the costs of another's improvement is too rigid.
Few landowners would be happy to learn that they must bear the cost of
ridding their land of surface waters which were cast upon them when a
massage parlor was built next door. But such would be the result under the
common enemy rule. This rule, in attempting to promote the policy of
favoring land development, conflicts with many other valid policies. If the
common enemy rule conflicts with other public policy, if the need for
development is no longer as great, and if the rule may only under certain
circumstances promote improvement and development, then the argument
for the common enemy rule in urban areas loses much of its vitality.
119. See Maloney & Plager, supra note 75, at 78; Hanks, Law of Waters in New
Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 621, 690 (1968).
120. Wisconsin rejected the common enemy rule and expressly overruled
Watters in State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).
121. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 10.
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IV. REASONABLE USE RULE IN URBAN AREAS
A. History
Under the reasonable use rule a landowner's liability turns on a deter-
mination of the reasonableness of his actions. That is, a landowner who
interferes with the flow of surface water is liable only when such interference
is unreasonable. The issue of reasonableness is a question of fact to be
determined upon considering all the relevant circumstances. 124 Some of
these circumstances were stated in Swett v. Cutts125 in 1870:
In determining this question all the circumstances of the case
would of course be considered; and among them the nature and
importance of the improvements sought to be made, the extent of
the interference with the water, and the amount of injury done to
the other landowners as compared with the value of such
improvements. 126
By including these factors the court foreclosed, at an early point in the
history of the rule, any argument that the reasonable use rule would
prohibit or discourage improvement of land. Before 1956 only two
jurisdictions had adopted the reasonable use rule. 127 Since that time at least
ten other jurisdictions have adopted this rule, eight of them in the past ten
years.1
28
Some states whch had followed the civil law or common enemy rule
modified these rules to such an extent that they "evolved" into the
reasonable use rule. 129 Kinyon and McClure point out that in Minnesota the
process was as follows: "First, the unqualified common enemy rule; then
specific exceptions; then the 'qualified' common enemy rule; and finally,
124. Kinyon & McClure, Interference with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891,
904 (1940); Davis & Snodgrass, supra note 91, at 152.
125. 50 N.H. 439 (1870).
126. Id. at 446.
127. New Hampshire: Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870); and Minnesota:
Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948).
128. Alaska: Weinberg v. Northern Alaska Development Corp., 384 P.2d 450
(Alaska 1963); Hawaii: Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970);
Kentucky: Klutey v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways, 428 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1967)
(may have merely adopted a reasonable use modification to the civil law rule); New
Jersey: Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956); North Dakota:
Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967); Rhode Island: Butler v. Bruno,
341 A.2d 735 (R.I. 1975); South Dakota:-Mulder v. Tague, 85 S.D. 544, 186 N.W.2d
884 (1971) (as to urban lands); Texas: City of Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d
322 (Tex. 1968) (as to urban lands); Utah: Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d
285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971); Wisconsin: State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407
(1974).
In addition the reasonable use rule may be in effect in Ohio as to urban lands,
Lunsford v. Stewart, 95 Ohio App. 383, 120 N.E.2d 136 (1953), and in Delaware
generally, E.J. Hollingsworth Co. v. Jardel Co., 40 Del. Ch. 196, 178 A.2d 307 (1962).
129. Cf. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Enderson v.
Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948); Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J.
320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956); Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967).
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the gradual adoption of the reasonable use principle as the sole test."'30
Consequently, when Minnesota finally adopted the full reasonable use rule
it was not a complete rejection of the rule, which the Minnesota courts had
been applying.13 1 Instead, the adoption of the reasonable use rule was the
last step towards developing a rule adaptable to modern society.
The increased number of disputes arising in urban areas may have
precipitated this evolutionary process in some states. 13 2 However, other
states such as Missouri have reached the "qualified" common enemy
stage, but have been reluctant to take the next step of adopting the
reasonable use principle as the sole test.13 3 Still other states have rejected
an express attempt to have a reasonable use test applied to urban areas.13 4
B. Modifications Aimed at Adapting the
Reasonable Use Rule to Urban Areas
While the common enemy rule and civil law rule have undergone
various modifications, the reasonable use rule has remained substantially
the same. 35 This does not necessarily mean, however, that the results
reached under the reasonable use rule have remained the same. Changes in
public policy may be reflected in a court's decision, for under the
reasonable use rule courts balance the utility of the use against the gravity
of the harm. Because society's concept of a certain use changes, the rule
remains current. Whether the rule is applied in cities, suburbs, or rural
areas, by balancing the utility of use against the gravity of harm, different
policy considerations for different areas are given weight in reaching a
result.
The jurisdictions which have adopted the reasonable use rule have set
forth different formulations for determining liability.'36 However, because
the results reached under one formulation will probably not differ from
results reached under another formulation, it may be helpful to set forth one
of these formulations to illustrate the factors involved.
130. Kinyon & McClure, supra note 124, at 935.
131. See Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163,32 N.W.2d 286 (1948); Sheehan
v. Flynn, 59 Minn. 436, 61 N.W. 462 (1894).
132. Rhode Island and Wisconsin are examples of jurisdictions which made a
complete break from their previous rules, instead of evolving their rules through a
process of modifications into the reasonable use rule. See Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d
735 (R.I. 1975) and State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).
133. Cf. Miller Land Co. v. Liberty Township, 510 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. En Banc
1974); Wells v. State Highway Comm'n, 503 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1973); Camden Special
Rd. Dist. v. Taylor, 495 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
134. Mello v. Lepisto, 77 Ill. App. 2d 399, 222 N.E.2d 543 (1966).
135. Compare Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870) with Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d
735 (R.I. 1975).
136. For three somewhat different approaches see Enderson v. Kelehan, 226
Minn. 163,32 N.W.2d 286 (1948); Armstrongv. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320,120 A.2d
4 (1956); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).
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Several jurisdictions follow the formulation adopted by Minnesota in
Enderson v. Kelehan.'37 In Enderson the court considered the following
factors:
(1) Is there a reasonable necessity for such drainage?
(2) Has reasonable care been taken to avoid unnecessary injury to
the land receiving the water?
(3) Does the benefit accruing to the land drained reasonably
outweigh the resulting harm?
(4) When practicable, is the diversion accomplished by reasonably
improving the normal and natural system of drainage, or
if such a procedure is not practicable, has a reasonable and
feasible artifical drainage system been installed? 138
Since the reasonable use rule was first adopted, the third factor listed
above has been a key factor in determining liability.' 39 Whether this factor
is expressd as weighing the benefit to the land with the resulting harm or
balancing the utility of the use with the gravity of the harm, it is basic to all
the formulations of the reasonable use rule.
40
C. Modern Status of Reasonable Use Rule in Urban Areas
With approximately twelve jurisdictions following the full reasonable
use rule' 1 ' and almost the same number of jurisdictions having
modified the civil law or common enemy rule by a test of reasonable use
or reasonable care,' 42 it is clear that many courts favor the basic
philosophy of reasonableness in deciding surface water disputes. The
increased number of surface water disputes arising in urban areas where
land use is varied has been one impetus towards acceptance of the
reasonable use rule.
Probably the one advantage of the reasonable use rule to which
courts most often refer is its flexibility.14 3 Consider the flexibility of the
rule in regard to the notion that it is in the public's interest to encourage
improvement and development of land. While as a general proposition it
may be in the public's interest to encourage improvement and development
137. 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948).
138. Id. at 289, 32 N.W.2d at 289. See also Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 740
(R.I. 1975).
139. See, e.g., Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163,32 N.W.2d 286 (1948); Swett
v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870); Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4
(1956); Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735 (R.I. 1975); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224
N.W.2d 407 (1974).
140. See cases cited note 136 supra.
141. See cases cited note 127, 128 supra.
142. California and Maryland have modified their civil law rules by a test of
reasdnable use. Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273, 412 P.2d 529
(1966); Baer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 255 Md. 163, 257 A.2d 201 (1969).
Washington is an example of a common enemy jurisdiction which has adopted a
reasonable use modification. Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wash. 2d 491 , 519 P.2d 7 (1974).
143. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956). See also
5 R.R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 731 (1962).
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of land, in specific cases the public's interest may be otherwise. One person's
"improvement" may be another's nuisance. Under the common
enemy rule the "improver" in constructing a nuisance is privileged to rid
his land of surface waters even if it causes damage to an adjoining
landowner. 144 However, under the reasonable use rule, it is likely that the
"improving" landowner, in this situation, would be liable for the resulting
harm to adjoining landowners. 145 Where the common enemy rule is
supposed to encourage any "improvement" and the civil law rule to
discourage any "improvement," the reasonable use rule, because of its
flexibility, is not so limited.
Whereas some courts thought that the common enemy rule worked
well in urban areas and the civil law rule in rural areas, 146 the reasonable
use rule is not so limited. The flexibility of the reasonable use rule makes
it a practical rule for both urban and rural areas. By balancing the utility
of use against the gravity of harm, the different policy considerations for
the different areas are given weight in finding a result. There is no need to
restrict the rule to certain areas within a single state.
Still another advantage of the reasonable use rule is that, unlike the
common enemy rule, it does not attempt to promote any single policy
considerations such as improvement of land. In adopting the reasonable
use rule, several jurisdictions have indicated that although it is still true
that the policy of promoting improvement of land is important, it is only
one of the many factors which should be considered in determining
whether the utility of the actor's conduct outweighs the gravity of harm
to others.
147
The major criticism of the reasonable use rule is that the rule lacks
predictability because reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined
on a case by case approach.148 The proponents of the civil law rule
and the common enemy rule argue that those rules are advantageous in
that they give to a concerned landowner the advantage of predictability.
149
Certainly it is true that the reasonable use rule lacks predictability
but, as the Supreme Court of Rhode Island recently stated:
[A] desire for certainty of liability should not and must not serve
as a judicial pardon for the unreasonable conduct which has
been manifested by any landowner in our modern society.
150
144. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
145. Cf. Sachs v. Chiat, 281 Minn. 540, 162 N.W.2d 243 (1868); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826-27 (Tentative Draft No. 18, 1972).
146. See text accompanying notes 25-31 supra.
147. Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956); State v. Deetz,
66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).
148. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396,50 Cal. Rptr. 273,412 P.2d 529 (1966).
149. Id. Cf. Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735 (R.I. 1975).
150. Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 741 (R.I. 1975).
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Moreover, the civil law rule and common enemy rule no longer have the
predictability they once might have had.'- In many jurisdictions the
civil law rule and common enemy rule have been modified by various
exceptions that lead to lack of predictability. Furthermore, it is likely
that the civil law rule and common enemy rule will become more
uncertain, especially in urban areas where many of the "hard" cases are
decided. The attempt to make these rules more adaptable to urban areas
without adopting some form of the rule of reasonableness requires a
court to modify these rules and add even more uncertainty to them.
Because the reasonable use rule is flexible, adaptable to cities and
suburbs, is not limited to promoting any single policy consideration, and
allows a court to reach a fair result in individual cases, it is a practical
rule for areas where land use is varied and disputes are likely to occur.
The "benefits" of the rule clearly outweigh any "harm" caused by its lack of
predictability.
V. CONCLUSION
When the surface water rules were being developed, it was often
stated that the common enemy rule was the most practical rule for urban
areas and the civil law rule the least practical. This conclusion was
reached by focusing only on the issue of development and improvement
of land.
While many cases still conclude that the civil law rule is the least
desirable rule for urban areas, it is this writer's opinion that the civil law rule
is neither the least nor the most desirable of the rules. The least desirable
rule for urban areas is the common enemy rule. The most desirable rule is
the unreasonable use rule.
The common enemy rule is the least desirable rule because in attempt-
ing to promote the policy consideration of improvement of land, the rule
conflicts with other policy considerations and makes adjoining landowners
bear the cost of another's "improvement". Moreover, one landowner who is
"encouraged" to make improvements may at the same time be "encouraged"
to damage his neighbor's improvements. In most states the modifications to
the rule have gone far enough to make the rule a practical one for urban
areas.
Simply because the civil law rule makes the improver bear the cost of
his improvements does not make the rule an undesirable one for urban
areas. A closer analysis of the fact that the improver must bear the cost of
his improvements shows that the rule has not hindered improvement and
development in urban areas. However, the civil law rule does not normally
consider the reasonableness of the landowner's behavior. Consequently, the




Bridges: Bridges: Application of Surface Water Rules in Urban Areas
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
SURFACE WATER RULES
rule is not the most desirable one for urban areas because it
lacks the flexibility which is needed in an area where land use is varied
and different policy considerations come into conflict. 152 However, the
reasonable use modification to the civil law rule provides this needed
flexibility and is a rule which is adaptable to urban needs.
Because of its flexibility, the reasonable use rule is the most desirable
rule for urban areas. The flexibility of the rule allows a court to
reach a fair result whether the dispute arose in a city, suburb, or rural
area. The rule is not limited to promoting any single policy consideration,
remains current without the need for various modifications and, by its
very nature, is adaptable to urban needs.
CHARLES E. BRIDGES
152. Another problem with the civil law rule, which is especially evident in urban
areas, is that it is often difficult to determine what the natural conditions were or
would be if not altered. See City of Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.
1968), where the Texas Supreme Court stated that it preferred the reasonable use
rule "at least with respect to urban property where conditions are constantly
changing and it is generally difficult or even impossible to establish how surface water
flowed 'when untouched and undirected by the hand of man'." Id. at 325. See also
Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396,406,50 Cal. Rptr. 273,289,412 P.2d 529,536 (1966).
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